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As corporate wrongdoing has emerged as a major problem in Ameri-
can society," courts,2 legislatures, 3 and commentators4 have increasingly
recognized that corporations may be held liable for committing virtu-
ally any crime.5 Companies have been convicted of a wide range of
1. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 30-
32 (1976) (discussing statistical evidence of growing "corporate crime wave," including
crimes committed by leading corporations in diverse industries); Comment, Criminal
Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 40 (1978) (costs of
corporate crime "staggering"); Taubman, U.S. Attack on Corporate Crime Yields Handful
of Cases in 2 Years, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1979, at 1, 29 (government estimates total costs
of corporate and white-collar crime exceed $200 billion annually).
2. The Supreme Court first recognized the criminal liability of corporations in New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). That case
established the two elements necessary for the imposition of corporate liability: the acts
incurring liability must have been done on behalf of the corporation, and they must have
been done by an agent of the corporation acting within the scope of his authority. Id. at
494-95. Subsequently, standards of liability for corporate defendants have been variously
phrased. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1246-51 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Developments]; Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE:
L.J. 1091, 1093-95 (1976). See generally L. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATONS
IN ENGLISH LAW (1969) (discussing history and decline of conceptual and pragmatic
barriers to corporate liability); Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L.
REv. 21 (1957) (same).
3. Many current and proposed statutes explicitly provide for corporate criminal liability.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 281 (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20 (McKinney 1975);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (P.O.D. 1962). Explicit provision for such liability is also made
in the most widely discussed Senate version of the proposed Federal Criminal Code
revision, the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978, see S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402
(1978), reprinted in XIII Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1437
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9485-9792 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1437], and in the
House version of the bill, see H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 6869]. See I NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKING PAPERS 214-15 (1970) (comparing provisions for corporate criminal liability in
various current and proposed statutes) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS]. Corporate
liability for any offense for which an individual may be held criminally liable under the
current Federal Criminal Code is implicitly authorized by a provision defining "persons"
as used throughout the Code to include "corporations, companies, associations," and
others unless the context indicates otherwise. I U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. See, e.g., 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 167 (applicability of federal criminal
statutes to inanimate legal entities such as corporations and partnerships well estab-
lished); Mueller, supra note 2, at 22 ("[T]he law has rapidly moved to the stand that a
corporation can be guilty of most, if not all, crimes.")
5. One of the few crimes for which there remains any doubt whether corporations
may be held liable is manslaughter. Compare State v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 94 N.J.L.
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serious criminal offenses in recent years,0 and government regulation
of corporations has come to rely more and more on criminal prosecu-
tions.7
Despite the growing importance of these prosecutions, neither
courts, legislatures, nor commentators have seriously addressed the
question of corporate sentencing.8 The sentences imposed in virtually
all cases have been fines,9 and judges and critics alike have repeatedly
asserted that a fine was the only sentence that could be imposed on a
convicted corporation.' Proposals for sentencing reform have centered
exclusively on various means of imposing more severe fines."
This Note argues that fines fail to take account of the significant
171, 111 A. 257 (1920) (manslaughter indictment upheld, corporation fined upon plea of
nolo contendere) with State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 360 P.2d 530 (1961) (man-
slaughter indictment quashed, corporation held not "person" within meaning of pertinent
statute). There has been an increase in such prosecution in recent years. See, e.g., State
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978), discussed in N.Y.
Times, Nov. 2, 1978, at 58 (Ford Motor Co. indicted for reckless homicide); N.Y. Times,
July 10, 1979, § B, at 1 (indictment charging Warner-Lambert Co. with manslaughter
and criminally negligent homicide reinstated by New York state appellate court). See
generally Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decisionmaking, 54
NOTRE DAME LAw. 911 (1979).
6. Crimes of which corporations have been convicted include food adulteration, see,
e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); environmental pollution, see, e.g., United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972); price fixing, see, e.g., United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); bribery, see, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 401 F. Supp. 1222
(S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Metro Management Corp., 541 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1976); conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376
(7th Cir. 1941); and making false statements on government forms, see, e.g., United
States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976). Cf. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at
167-73 (collecting cases).
7. Developments, supra note 2, at 1229; see Taubman, supra note 1, at 1 (lack of
manpower and expertise has hampered government's attempts to prosecute corporate
crimes, particularly in cases involving large corporations).
8. See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 184-85 (federal statutes authorizing corpo-
rate fines and judicial decisions applying them seem to be based on premise that corpora-
tion can be deterred or coerced just as individuals can); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS-
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 35-37 (1975) (law has responded to growth
of corporations simply by transferring theories and sanctions previously applied to in-
dividuals to corporations).
9. The only exceptions appear to be six cases in which a corporation was placed on
probation. See note 92 infra.
10. See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958) ("As in the
case of corporations, the conviction of the [partnership] entity can lead only to a fine
levied on the firm's assets."); Hechtman, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10
(McKinney 1975) ("When a corporation is convicted of an offense, the only penal sanction
that can be used is a fine."); McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal
Liability: An Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 989, 993 (1977) ("the fine is virtually
the only sanction which may be imposed against the entity itself"); Note, supra note 5,
at 922 ("fines are the only possible penalty").
11. See, e.g., Davids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 524, 530
(1967); Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime: A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 291 (1961).
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novel qualities of institutional crime, 12 thereby frustrating the goals
that corporate criminal liability is intended to serve. Part I identifies
two organizational features central to the operation of large corpora-
tions, and derives from them a concept of "structural crime." Part II
defines the goals that sentences imposed upon large corporations should
serve, analyzing in particular the possibility of rehabilitating a complex
organization, and argues that fines are inherently unsuited to achieving
these objectives. Part III concludes that sentences ordering limited
internal restructuring of the corporate processes whose failure led to
a violation can often achieve these goals more efficiently, and proposes
that such interventions be imposed in appropriate cases as conditions
of a term of corporate probation.
I. The Unique Qualities of the Corporate Criminal
A corporation, to a lawyer, is an artificial entity possessing only those
formal qualities prescribed by law. To a student of organizational be-
havior, by contrast, a corporation is a dynamic system of interacting
processes, with an internal "life" that can exert a dramatic influence
on its personnel. Each of these perspectives identifies different char-
acteristics of a corporation that are of critical importance in under-
standing the nature of corporate crime and in determining appropriate
legal responses to it.
A. Legal Structure: The Separation of Ownership and Control
In small or closely held companies, controlling stockholders exercise
direct control over all significant operational decisions. 13 In large,
12. This Note focuses on corporations because of the number and seriousness of crim-
inal problems that their activities have generated, but its thesis applies in most respects
to large institutions generally. First, institutions other than corporations may be held
criminally liable. See United States v. A 8- P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123-27 (1958)
(partnership may be held criminally liable); cf. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 165-66,
173-76 (unincorporated associations, such as unions and trade associations, should be
subject to same rules of criminal liability as corporations; government bodies and agencies
might be exempted); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(3)-(4) (P.O.D. 1962) (suggesting criteria
for criminal liability of unincorporated associations). Second, many large noncorporate
institutions share the formal and organizational characteristics that make possible the
occurrence of structural crimes, primarily management by a separate, professional corps
of managers and a complex and diffuse decisionmaking system. See pp. 356-59 infra; cf.
I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 182 n.58 (defining "corporation" as used therein to
include "all types of artificial entities, including partnerships and other unincorporated
associations, in which ownership and operation are divided.")
13. See R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 46-47 (1945);
Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 53-59 (1969).
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publicly held companies, on the other hand, the power to control
virtually every aspect of corporate operations is held by managers with
little or no ownership interest in them,14 while stockholders are rela-
tively powerless. 15
Two results of this separation suggest that stockholders or market
forces may be unable to provide effective controls on corporate acts
and may be unable to prevent much corporate crime. First, those rights
that stockholders can enforce relate almost entirely to intracorporate
relationships,'0 while the corporation's liability for criminal offenses
is limited to acts committed in furtherance of the financial interests of
the company as a whole.' 7 As a result, managers have virtually complete
control over those decisions that might generate corporate criminal
liability.' 8
Second, while stockholders have as their major interest the maxi-
mization of company profits, managers in large corporations make
their decisions in response to a variety of other motivations as well.' 0
As a result, managers will be led to make decisions systematically at
variance with stockholders' interests, 20 and stockholders will be unable
14. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY at xix-
xxx, 78-84 (rev. ed. 1968); R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 23.
15. See, e.g., 1 The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (of 111 share-
holder proposals voted on by 80 corporations in first five months of 1977, none passed); 1
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 189 (shareholders in large companies cannot, in practice,
control or influence managers); Developments, supra note 2, at 1242 ("[I]n any but small,
closely held corporations, the average stockholder wields no actual influence over the
decisions of even the highest-placed executives.").
16. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 11-13, 26 (stockholders entitled to vote only on
matters of corporate structure). But see Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate
Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 388, 398 (1977) (some of share-
holders' legal rights within corporations have been made meaningful).
17. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Gibson Products Co., 426 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
18. Cf. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 188-89 (shareholders almost never in posi-
tion to participate in conduct constituting offense by corporation).
19. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 116-18 (3d ed. 1978) (especially
in corporations with some market power, corporate "technostructure" responds to many
goals other than profit maximization); R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 305-07 (assumption
of profit maximization at best an approximation; as competitive economic pressures lessen
for large companies, executives' decisions depend increasingly on personal motivations
and organizational dynamics). Commentators who assume that corporations "carefully"
profit maximize and violate the law "only if it appears profitable," see Developments,
supra note 2, at 1365, ignore these factors.
20. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 36-39 (given "satisfactory" profits, managers seek
personal security and benefits, and corporate expansion and prestige, rather than maxi-
mum profits); Note, The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying
Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1239-44 (1979) (differences
in risks and benefits between managers and stockholders lead to systematic conflicts of
interest).
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to control these decisions effectively. Not only are stockholder controls
over management weak in general, 21 but stockholders are unable to
identify managers responsible for particular decisions. 22
B. Organizational Structure: The Diffusion of Managerial
Decisionmaking
The corporation may also be viewed, not as a legal fiction, but as a
sociological system that can critically influence the people who comprise
it, particularly its decisionmakers n.2  Analysts of organizational behavior
have repeatedly noted that bureaucratic forces, institutional routines,
and group decisionmaking are critical to the management of large
corporations.2 4 Moreover, companies develop internal norms and goal
structures that can shape the values and actions of their managerial
personnel.2
5
In addition to these sociological factors, large companies have an
inherent organizational complexity that tends to diffuse and to obscure
individual responsibility for corporate actions.26 Two related corporate
processes play a particularly crucial role in this diffusion. Internal con-
trol systems aim to ensure that plans established by senior officials are
carried out according to instructions, 27 while internal communication
systems are designed in part to ensure that information about the im-
21. See p. 356 suPra.
22. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 45; Developments, supra note 2, at 1368.
23. See H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 102-03 (1947) (organization influences
decisions by specializing responsibilities and by establishing standard operating pro-
cedures); C. STONE, supra note 8, at 1-3 (corporation viewed as legal phenomenon has
different implications for social policy from corporation viewed as sociological entity). See
generally D. CHAMPION, THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 24-59 (1975) (reviewing various
models of organizational behavior); F. LUTHANS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 113-87 (1973)
(same).
24. R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 99 (prevalence of group, instead of individual, action
a striking characteristic of management organization in large corporations); see, e.g., H.
LEAVITT, MANAGERIAL PSYCHOLOGY 328-41 (4th ed. 1978) (organizational structure critically
important in shaping behavior and decisions of managers); H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN:
SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 241-73 (1957) (bureaucratic forces and institutional routines highly
influential in organizational decisionmaking). Commentators who assume a unitary,
wholly rational model in which corporations always "decide" or "choose" to violate the
law, see, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1365, fail to account for these realities.
25. See, e.g., M. CLINARD 9- R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 213 (2d ed. 1973)
("Lawbreaking can become a normative pattern within certain corporations .. "); E.
SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 234-56 (1949) (criminal behavior by corporate officials
occurs in contexts in which attitudes and procedures encourage such actions).
26. Note, sutra note 2, at 1091; see R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 46-47 (authority and
decisionmaking divided many ways in large corporations); Developments, supra note 2, at
1243 (criminal acts of modem corporation result not from isolated acts of single agent,
but from complex interactions of many agents in bureaucratic setting).
27. See F. LUTHANS, suPra note 23, at 257-65 (discussing aims, elements, and means of
evaluating internal corporate control systems).
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plementation of programs returns to the planners.28 Gaps in either of
these two processes can make an ascription of responsibility for corpo-
rate acts to particular individuals difficult or impossible: the delega-
tion of decisional or supervisory duties from higher management down-
ward through several levels and outward across several divisions may
fail to account for certain necessary responsibilities, 29 while the trans-
mission of information back up through an equally complex hierarchy
may fail to provide adequate processing of potentially critical informa-
tion by appropriate officials.
30
This combination of organizational complexity and obscured in-
dividual responsibility gives rise to the possibility of a corporation
committing what might be called "structural crimes," 31 instances in
which a corporation commits a criminal offense but no criminally
culpable individual can be identified.
3 2
28. Planners need information both to make initial decisions and to follow up on the
implementation of decisions. See R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 75-76 (decisionmaking in
large organizations involves both downward delegation of responsibility and upward
transmission of information); H. SIMON, supra note 23, at 123-71 (organization transmits
decisions downward through systems of authority and influence, and provides channels
of communication in all directions to transmit information necessary to decisions).
29. See B. HODGE & H. JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 148-58
(1970) (importance of corporate communications system to effective decisionmaking); L.
PORTER, E. LAWLER, & J. HACKMAN, BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONs 262-70 (1975) (potential
for dysfunction persistent in organizational control structures).
30. See, e.g., J. LITTERER, THE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONS 498-502, 547-48 (2d ed. 1973)
(discussing some major causes of "noise" or errors in organizational communication sys-
tems); C. STONE, supra note 8, at 199-227 (flaws in corporate "information net" and
"decision process" crucial to occurrence of corporate offenses).
31. A concept similar to that of structural crime has been advanced in several recent
analyses of the appropriate standard for holding a corporation criminally liable. Under
one proposal, a corporation would be presumed liable for crimes committed on its behalf
by agents acting within the scope of their authority, but could rebut that presumption by
proving "that it, as an organization, exercised due diligence to prevent the crime," that
is, that "reasonable safeguards designed to prevent corporate crimes had been developed
and implemented, including regular procedures for evaluation, detection, and remedy."
Developments, supra note 2, at 1257-58. Other approaches have focused on the importance
of organizational factors in corporate decisionmaking, see Note, supra note 2, at 1100-05,
or on the importance of holding corporate officials liable for failures in supervision, see
1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 186-88.
However, none of these commentaries has recognized the implications of such an
analysis for corporate sentencing: as standards for imposing liability on corporations move
increasingly toward reliance on structural features, the number of instances in which it
is desirable to have a sentence responding directly to internal failures will increase, and
the importance of such reform in those cases will grow. Thus, when these analyses con-
tinue to urge exclusive reliance on fines as a sentence for convicted corporations, see, e.g.,
Developments, supra note 2, at 1366, they ignore at the remedy stage the very elements
identified as critical at the liability stage. Furthermore, the fact that at least one of these
analyses ignores the crucial role of organizational dynamics and managerial incentives in
corporate decisionmaking, see notes 19 and 24 supra (criticizing Developments analysis),
suggests that the kind of due diligence acceptable under such an analysis would fail to
ensure that sufficiently reliable and extensive structural reform would be undertaken.
32. No culpable individual can be identified in many instances in which the criminal
liability of the corporation is clear. See, e.g., United States v. American Stevedores, Inc.,
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The occurrence of a structural crime may reflect either of two un-
derlying patterns. In one class of cases, no individual can be convicted
because no one has acted or failed to act in such a manner that per-
sonal criminal liability is warranted.3 3 These situations involve "good
faith" failures: although there may be negligence on the part of some
corporate officials, no individual has acted deliberately to further com-
mission of an offense. In an organizationally complex corporation, with
multiple divisions of responsibility and layers of authority, such cu-
mulative individual inadvertence alone can generate criminal viola-
tions by the corporation. 34
In the second class of cases, no individual officials can be convicted
despite elements of bad faith or intentional misconduct by some. 35 If
after diligent investigation by prosecutorial authorities the guilt of such
individuals cannot be demonstrated, it must be the case that structural
elements in the company have permitted culpable parties to shield
their guilt. As in the first class of cases, offenses of this type may occur
because of deficiencies in the systems for transmitting information or
for delegating responsibility in a large and complex company.3 6
310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 969 (1963) (conviction of corporation
for tax evasion not inconsistent with acquittal of principal officers, directors, and share-
holders on same charge); Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950,
953-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959) (conviction of corporation not pre-
cluded by acquittal of corporate president of same offense).
33. Under most current statutes, an individual must be found to have been actively
responsible for the criminal acts of an organization in order to be held personally crim-
inally liable. See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 183-85. However, standards for
imposing criminal liability on individual officials appear to be evolving toward greater
imposition of affirmative obligations. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-73
(1975) (corporate president held criminally liable under statute imposing affirmative
obligations); I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 186-88 (discussing recent statutes and
proposals that impose individual liability for ratifying or failing to prevent corporate
offenses). But see Criminal Code Revisions Changed Under Business Lobby Pressures,
Legal Times of Washington, June 25, 1979, at 7 (provisions imposing liability for "reck-
less failure to supervise" likely to be dropped when proposed federal criminal code
revision reintroduced in Congress).
34. Such negligence may occur in the design of the relevant corporate operating
procedures, in a failure of oversight regarding procedures generating a potential for
criminal offenses, or in a failure to respond adequately to danger signals in a particular
factual situation. For an example of such a phenomenon in an incident that has not as of
this writing led to any criminal proceedings, see N.Y. Times, July 20, 1979, at I (manu-
facturer's engineers all failed to take action on memoranda suggesting problems that
eventually materialized at Three Mile Island nuclear facility, on assumption someone
else would do so).
35. Juries sometimes convict a corporation and not individuals even when the guilt of
the individuals seems at least as certain as that of the corporation. See, e.g., United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618
(1941) (corporation convicted; "We can not understand how the jury could have acquitted
all of the individual defendants."); Note, supra note 2, at 1096 n.27 (citing cases). But see
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (upholding conviction of corporate
president by jury that acquitted corporation of same offense).
36. See pp. 357-58 supra. Actual examples of this class of cases are difficult to identify,
since the successful obfuscation of individual guilt makes these cases appear to be in-
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Each of these structural features is inherent in the organization of a
large corporation; thus, any attempt to prevent or respond to crimes
committed by such companies must take account of them if it is to
succeed.
II. A Critique of Current Sentences: The Inadequacy of Fines
Both the current approach to sentencing convicted corporations and
proposals for sentencing reform have centered almost exclusively on
fines. Assessing the effectiveness of fines requires first an analysis of the
appropriate goals of corporate sentencing; measured against these ob-
jectives, fines are shown to be inadequate because of their failure to
take any account of the unique structural qualities of convicted corpo-
rations.
A. A Conceptual Framework: Sentencing Goals and the Corporation
Criminal sentences are widely agreed to serve several important goals,
including punishment of culpable parties, deterrence of potential crim-
inals, and rehabilitation of offenders. 37 These goals, however, have
traditionally been translated into specific sentencing policies only with
respect to individual offenders. 38 An adequate response to corporate
crime, by contrast, requires sentencing objectives that respond to the
unique structural features of corporate crime.
Thus, these goals must be redefined to apply to corporations. First,
since entities as such cannot be punished, retribution in the context of
stances of the first class. However, courts sometimes suggest that they believe a case to
be of this latter class nonetheless. See, e.g., Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d
363, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1949) (conviction of company combined with acquittal of all in-
dividuals calls into question correctness of verdict); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp.,
31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929) ("How an intelligent jury could have acquitted any of the
[individual] defendants we cannot conceive.")
37. Goals essentially equivalent to retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation are a
central feature of proposed criminal code revisions. See S. 1437, supra note 3, at § 101(b);
H.R. 6869, supra note 3, at § 101(b); cf. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT 2 (1971) (comment discussing goals of such statutes) [herein-
after cited as FINAL REPORT]. Many commentators have advocated the same goals. See P.
O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN, & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM
43-49, 53-54 (1977); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 61-63,
71-80 (7th ed. 1967); cf. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
401, 401-02 (1958) (social purposes underlying system of criminal law necessarily complex
and any single purpose taken alone would be inappropriate).
38. See C. STONE, suPra note 8, at 1-2, 8-10; cf. Developments, supra note 2, at 1300
(sanctions used are decisive to effectiveness of any scheme of corporate regulation). For a
general attempt to apply "consequentialist and retributive theories of punishment" to
corporate crime, see id. at 1231-39.
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corporate sentencing must be directed only at individually culpable
parties.39 Second, deterrence of corporate crime requires that sentences
impose burdens on those managers with responsibility for operations
that may generate corporate crimes in the future,40 and that these
burdens be sufficiently unpleasant 4' and certain 42 to outweigh any
incentives to perform acts that facilitate corporate crime.
Translating the third goal of the criminal law, rehabilitation, into
corporate sentencing objectives presents the most novel and challenging
task of redefinition, 43 in part because the concept of rehabilitation in
traditional usage is heavily laden with psychological, therapeutic, and
humanitarian connotations. 44 The core of the concept, however,
identifies a goal that should be a crucial objective of all corporate sen-
tences: changing an offender's behavior so as to reduce the probability
of future violations by that offender.45 Rehabilitating a corporation
requires that its internal operations and procedures be restructured
in such a way as to foster future compliance with the law; institutional
elements that facilitated the commission of an offense must be modi-
fied so that they operate subsequently to prevent violations.46
39. See Note, supra note 11, at 282 (punishment is peculiarly reserved for individuals,
and cannot meaningfully be imposed on legal form).
40. "Deterrence" indicates here the attempt to discourage similar violations by other
parties or in the society as a whole, sometimes referred to as "general deterrence". See F.
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 158-60 (1973). "Specific deterrence," the prevention
of future violations by a particular offender, is achievable in the corporate context as an
element of corporate rehabilitation, or through a sentence requiring the suspension of
particular corporate activities.
41. See C. BECCARiA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 62-64 (1963); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 172-97.
42. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 158-67; Antunes and Hunt, The
Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for Criminal Justice Policy,
51 J. URBAN L. 145, 157-58 (1973).
43. See Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary? 29 Sw. L.J. 908,
919 (1975-76) (" 'rehabilitation' is not generally thought of in connection with corpora-
tions"); ABA Criminal Code Revision Committee, Report with Recommendations 16
(January 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (many traditional aspects of rehabilitation
difficult to apply to corporations).
44. See, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 253-66 (1968) (therapeutic at-
titudes and psychological motivations crucial to successful rehabilitation); Weihofen,
Punishment and Treatment, in THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CoRRECrIoN 665-67 (S. Rubin ed.
1963) (rehabilitative ideal motivated by humanitarian considerations, belief in human
dignity, and similar factors).
45. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 53-58 (1968); see Allen,
Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226,
226 (1959) (rehabilitative measures should be designed primarily to change offender's
behavior in interest of societal protection).
46. See Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention, and Corporate Crime, 5 N.Z.U. L. REV. 250
(1973) (prevention of future offenses by corporation best served by court-ordered measures
aimed at reforming activities that led to commission of offense).
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B. The Impact and Failure of Fines
Despite the almost exclusive traditional reliance on fines as sentences
for corporate defendants, for many years such fines represented merely
nominal sanctions for large companies. 47 In recent years, however, both
the maximum amounts permitted by statutes48 and the average amount
of fines actually imposed 49 have increased significantly, and fines in
some cases have been dramatically large.50 These increases have been
justified and praised as having greater punitive and deterrent value.Y'
Proposals for reform, unanimously calling for even more substantial
fines for corporations, have suggested that fines be set at a percentage
of a corporation's assets or sales,52 or at an amount that would at least
result in the disgorgement of any illegally obtained gain.
53
Fines imposed on a corporate entity may affect many different
47. See Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search
of a Policy, 48 GEO. L. REv. 530, 532 n.9 (1960) (average fine imposed for Sherman Act
convictions estimated to be $2600 from 1946-53 and less than $13,000 from 1955-60); Note,
supra note 11, at 285-87 & nn.25-27 (fines levied against General Motors, duPont, General
Electric, and other large companies convicted of antitrust violations amounted to minute
percentages of assets or profits).
48. See, e.g., Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976)
(increasing maximum fine for corporate defendant from $50,000 to $1,000,000); Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1978) (authorizing
fines for corporate violators up to $1,000,000).
49. Between 1977 and 1978 alone, for example, total fines imposed on all corporate de-
fendants convicted under the antitrust laws jumped from $2,642,000 to almost $11,000,000.
Address by Benjamin Civiletti, Deputy Attorney General, Oct. 21, 1978 (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
50. In what appears to be the largest criminal fine ever imposed, the Allied Chemical
Corporation was fined a total of $13.2 million after pleading nolo contendere to 940
charges of violating the pollution control laws in connection with its Kepone waste dis-
posal program. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp.. [1976] 7 ENViR. REP. (BNA) 844.
51. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 914 (1977) (increased fines more
effectively penalize and deter corporate crime); Address by Benjamin Civiletti, supra note
49 (Justice Department believes higher fines imposed under new antitrust felony
provisions will help deter antitrust offenses).
52. See, e.g., Davids, supra note 11, at 530; Note, supra note 11, at 295.
53. Such proposals usually suggest that fines be set at amounts higher than those
required for simple disgorgement to take into account both the probability of conviction
and the degree of deterrence desired. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 295,
§ 3301(2); Developments, supra note 2, at 1370-71; Note, supra note 11, at 298-300. Several
state laws now authorize corporate fines set at twice the defendant's gain. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4208 (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00 (McKinney 1975); cf. S. 1437,
supra note 2, at § 2201(c) (proposing same rule for federal law). Several recently enacted
federal statutes require that penalties for violations take into account "the appropriateness
of such penalty to the size of the business of the owner or operator charged." See, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1321(b)(6) (1976). This criterion,
while acknowledged to discriminate between defendants who are members of the same
class, has been upheld against an equal protection challenge. See United States v. Eureka
Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 941-42 (N.D. W.Va. 1975); accord, Ford Motor Co. v. Cole-
man, 402 F. Supp. 475, 489 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 927 (1976) (upholding constitu-
tionality of similar provisions in National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1381, 1398 (1976)).
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parties, including stockholders, managers, nonmanagement employees,
creditors, trade customers, and consumers; 54 the extent of the burden
borne by each group is generally difficult to measure.55 Although
stockholders might appear to bear the direct burdens of corporate
monetary penalties,56 they apparently escape such burdens in many
instances as companies pass their losses on to consumers.57 Moreover,
stockholders may suffer no overall economic burden from fines im-
posed on a company, in that the price they paid for their stock, and its
current value, may reflect market expectations as to the estimated
likelihood and amount of such fines.58
The efficacy of fines in achieving corporate sentencing goals depends
upon their impact on those managers who have responsibility for the
decisions that might engender corporate crimes.59 Corporate fines, how-
ever, do not impose any direct personal burdens on such managers60
or provide any direct internal restructuring that could influence their
behavior, thereby leaving implementation of necessary structural re-
forms wholly to the discretion of the corporation. 61
The most efficient such reforms may not be adopted in response to
a fine, however, for the same reasons they were not instituted in-
itially; just as reliance on corporate fines as a threat rests on the as-
sumption that companies will respond with the optimal strategy for
preventing violations, so their imposition as a sanction rests on the
premise that the company will act most efficiently to prevent a recur-
54. See COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS
CORPORATxIONS 18-20 (1971); R. GORDON, supra note 13, at 147-48; Eisenberg, supra note 13,
at 16-21.
55. See Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40-41 (E. Mason ed. 1959) (recognizing interests of constituencies in
corporation not always easy); Butcher, The Program Management Approach, in CORPORATE
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING 277-79 (M. Dieckes & R. Bauer eds. 1973) (discussing various measures
attempting to assess impact of corporation's acts on its various constituencies).
56. See Davids, supra note 11, at 529-31; Comment, supra note 1, at 47-48.
57. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 685 (1953) (corporate fines are recouped by raising
prices); Note, supra note 11, at 285 n.17 (passing on probably occurs frequently, but may
be limited by market forces). But see Developments, supra note 2, at 1372 n.37 (assuming
that fines against one company cannot be passed on because of competition).
58. See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 189 n.77 (risks of criminal fine at least
theoretically reflected in price of stock); Developments, supra note 2, at 1372 n.27 (share-
holders assume risks of fines, and are not penalized if fine simply forces company to
disgorge illicit profits).
59. See pp. 355-56 supra.
60. See, e.g., Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 35 REPORTS OF THE ABA 427
(1910) (fines imposed on corporation "fall upon the wrong persons," upon those who
knew nothing about the transaction rather than those who originated and implemented
it); cf. Note, supra note 11, at 292 (sanctions imposed upon company felt directly by policy
formulators only in small, closely held corporations).
61. See Fisse, supra note 46, at 251 (all currently used corporate sanctions leave
corporation to decide for itself what measures, if any, to take to guard against future
violations).
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rence of offenses in the future. 2 As noted, however, this assumption
is often invalid in the case of large corporations: the fact that relevant
decisions in such companies are made by managers 3 who respond to
many factors other than profit maximization render them at best im-
perfectly responsive to monetary sanctions. 64 In addition, managers
may particularly undervalue the threat of legal sanctions. 5
The force of the inadequacies suggested by these conceptual factors
is demonstrated by the failure of fines to achieve the desired effects.
Not only does the overall level of corporate crime remain high," but
many large companies violate the law repeatedly, 7 and do so despite
the removal of any individually culpable executives who can be iden-
tified. 68 In addition, managers in positions to exercise general re-
sponsibility for inadequate corporate control systems involved are not
likely to be punished, and in fact may well be rewarded. 69
III. An Alternative Sentence: Judicial Intervention
Through Corporate Probation
In cases involving the special features of structural corporate crime,
judicially ordered restructuring of limited, discrete corporate decision-
62. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 36-39. For one analysis that relies crucially but
uncritically on that assumption, see Developments, supra note 2, at 1365 (corporations
"choose to violate the law only if it appears profitable. Profit-maximizing decisions are
carefully based upon the probability and amount of potential profit.
63. See pp. 355-57 supra.
64. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 36-39 (in practice, many corporations do not respond
to economic threats in accordance with classical profit-maximization theory); Fisse, supra
note 46, at 251 (same).
65. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 39-46 (factors contributing to this effect include
relatively small scale of any legal sanction in overall corporate affairs, lack of "loss of
face" involved in legal as opposed to business losses, prevailing sense that legal standards
are incomprehensible as guides to action, and noncentral role of legal staff as opposed to
other staffs in corporate planning).
66. See note 1 supra.
67. In one study of the 70 largest corporations in the United States, 60% were
classified as "habitual criminals" (four or more criminal convictions, most of which were
within 10-year period), see E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25, at 25, and 97% were classified
as "recidivists" (two or more decisions that corporation had committed crime), see id. at
218. For specific instances of this phenomenon, see Brief for United States at 2, United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972), discussed in C. STONE, supra
note 8, at 184 (Atlantic Richfield had already been convicted of same offense for which it
was convicted again); Galdston, Hooker Chemical's Nightmarish Pollution Record, 80
Bus. & Soc. REV. 25 (1979) (nation's tenth largest chemical company involved in repeated
pollution violations).
68. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 65-66; Davids, supra note 11, at 527.
69. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 47-48 (following corporate conviction, managers
often appear to improve their position rather than suffering any negative consequences);
Werner, supra note 16, at 389 n.10 (usual pattern for managers involved in practices of
questionable corporate legality is to be rewarded, or at least not penalized); cf. Wall St. J.,
Dec. 27, 1978, at 4 (chief executive officer of publicly traded company received full salary
while in prison for role in corporate crime and was given raise for following year).
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making procedures can better achieve the goals of corporate criminal
prosecutions than can fines. Such restructuring may be imposed, and
its precise elements established, as conditions of a sentence of corporate
probation.
A. The Merits of Judicial Intervention
Judicially mandated restructuring of internal corporate processes
can provide a more efficient sanction than can a fine. First, because the
costs of such reforms can be set at any level up to that of the maximum
authorized fine,70 and because a court may order a fine in addition to
internal reform,71 whatever deterrent or retributive goals are served
by compelled expenditures alone may be equally well achieved through
a sentence that includes an order for structural reform.
Furthermore, such reforms can provide important additional bene-
fits, thus necessarily providing greater efficiency. Most important,
corporate restructuring can directly further rehabilitative goals by
rectifying internal problems conducive to violations: the court redirects
the authorized monetary sanctions from the general treasury to mea-
sures aimed at preventing future offenses. In addition, because corpo-
rate managers perceive compliance with outside supervision as an un-
pleasant task, such measures impose personal burdens that directly
deter corporate managers who might play a part in future corporate
offenses.72 Finally, because judicial intervention can achieve relevant
objectives more efficiently than would fines, it lessens the burdens im-
posed on relatively innocent parties such as stockholders and con-
sumers
87
The potential effectiveness of such restructuring is similar to that of
the extensive organizational reforms that courts have undertaken with
respect to a number of public institutions in recent years.7 4 While
some critics have maintained that courts are inherently unsuited to
70. See pp. 368-69 infra.
71. A court may order payment of a fine together with any permissible conditions of
probation. See, e.g., Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1977); Bell v. United
States, 261 F. Supp. 594, 595-96 (E.D. Ill. 1966).
72. See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 19, at 81 ("In the American business code nothing is
so iniquitous as government interference in the internal affairs of the corporation.")
(emphasis in original); I. KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM 23 (1978) (corporate man-
agers resent outside interference).
73. See p. 363 supra (stockholders and consumers bear primary burden of corporate
fines).
74. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.). suppfilemented, 377 F. Supp.
995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in tart, remanded in Part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (ordering re-
forms in operation of prison); Note, Judicial Intervention and the Uses of Organization
Theory: Changing the Processes and Policies of Public Bureaucracies, 89 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming January 1980) (collecting cases).
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such tasks, 75 most commentators have concluded that the effort, prop-
erly managed, can be very successful. 76 The factors identified as
maximizing the success of such interventions-including careful def-
inition of the problem, 77  design of interventions tailored to the
particular organizational systems involved,78 narrow and discrete inter-
ventions, 79 and constant monitoring of implementation80-all appear
feasible in the corporate context.81
Internal restructuring of offending corporations may also be possible
through injunctive relief rather than through probation, and such
remedies have been ordered in a few cases brought by government
agencies.8 2 However, there may be limits on the availability of such
relief in certain cases,83 on the willingness of agencies to seek such
75. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 255-98 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1313-16 (1976); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 428, 461-63 (1977); cf. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for
Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 995-99 (1979) (suggesting procedural reforms designed
to increase effectiveness of such efforts).
77. See Note, supra note 74.
78. See id.; Note, "Mastering" Interventions in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1063-68
(1979).
79. See, e.g., Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv.
L. REV. 1779, 1805-14 (1976); Note, supra note 76, at 457-61.
80. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979); Note, supra note 76, at 440-45; Note, supra note 78, at 1089-91.
81. Indeed, structural reform could be expected to be even more successful in the
case of corporations than in the case of public institutions. While in the latter the struc-
ture of the institution itself is the evil, see Fiss, supra note 80, at 2, only certain
aspects of corporate structure are implicated in corporate crimes, suggesting that corporate
reform will require less extensive and more workable interventions.
82. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming appointment of
"limited receiver" with power to supervise corporation's public disclosures, investigate
certain transactions, and organize shareholders' meeting); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972) (appointing trustee to oversee corporate financial
decisions appropriate remedy in SEC action). For a case achieving limited reform through
a shareholders' derivative suit, see Order of Court and Stipulation, Project on Corporate
Responsibility v. Gulf Oil Corp., Civil Action No. 74-493 (D.D.C. June 27, 1974), discussed
in Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution, 61 IoWA L. REv.
545, 576-79 (1975).
83. Although the general rule that a court of equity has no jurisdiction over criminal
sentences, see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1895), has recognized exceptions for cases of
national emergencies, public nuisances, and express statutory grants of injunctive power
over crimes, see id.; United States v. Jalas, 409 F.2d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1969), the doctrine
retains its vitality outside these exceptions, see id.; Miller v. Mallery, 410 F. Supp. 1283,
1287 (D. Or. 1976); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
339, 34647 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); cf. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24[3], at 191-97 (2d ed.
1979) (discussing policy justifications underlying doctrine). Since there may not be an
independent civil ground for bringing an injunctive suit even after the occurrence of
some crimes, such as those involving bribery, illegal arms sales, and foreign corrupt pay-
ments, structural flaws that led to such an offense might be remediable only as part of a
criminal sanction. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1016-
17 (1965) (some courts will issue injunction upon showing that criminal sanctions are
trivial and would be ineffective; others require showing that repeated imposition of
criminal punishment has not deterred defendant).
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relief,84 or on its effectiveness in achieving broader objectives served
by criminal convictions.8 5 Nonetheless, the development of corporate
structural reform as a remedy in criminal cases should not serve to
preclude or impede the continued development of parallel remedies in
administrative injunctive proceedings. 86 Ultimately, it might simply
be said that since criminal prosecutions of corporations appear likely
to grow more frequent,87 the development of an effective sentencing
scheme for corporations is desirable independently of the possibility
that similar results may also be available in other cases through in-
junctions.""
B. Implementing the Proposal: Corporate Probation
Judicial restructuring may be imposed on a corporate criminal de-
fendant by sentencing the corporation as an entity to a term of pro-
bation. 9 Such a sentence appears permissible under both federal 0
84. Perhaps because agencies develop close affinities with regulated companies, or
perhaps because they are unwilling to test the limits of their authority, agencies have
rarely requested such relief. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 110 n.7 (1978); cf.
Chayes, supra note 76, at 1310-11 (unlike agencies, judges are not subject to "capture" by
regulated interests). The principal exception to this generalization is the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which has increasingly requested and obtained structural modifica-
tions in injunctive proceedings. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
85. For example, a conviction may aid in signifying that an offense is regarded as
seriously wrong, in communicating community censure of the acts both to potential
violators and to society at large, and thus in reinforcing collective moral standards and
deterring future offenses. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 40, at 141-57 (wide-
spread awareness of legal threats necessary to effective general deterrence); Underwood,
The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE
L.J. 1299, 1307-08 (1977) (fact that criminal convictions single adjudications out as
peculiarly serious increases their deterrent effect); Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion
or Reality? 43 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 176, 179-80 (1952) (punishments necessary to strengthen
moral inhibitions against crime and encourage law-abiding generally). But see DeveloP-
ments, supra note 2, at 1301 (distinction between civil and criminal offenses "hazy,"
especially as regards corporations; effect of stigma "largely speculative").
86. Professor Fiss has developed a general theory of the role and value of "structural
injunctions," injunctions used "to effectuate the reform of a social institution." 0. Fiss,
supra note 84, at 9; Fiss, supra note 80. Fiss has limited his analysis to public institutions;
the application of analogous remedies to corporate and other private institutional de-
fendants could be spurred by the development of a model of structural offenses such as
is proposed in this Note.
87. See Developments, suPra note 2, at 1229.
88. But cf. ABA Criminal Code Revision Committee, supra note 43, at 17-18 (probation
should not be used as substitute for injunctive relief in antitrust cases because of special
problems involved in formulating antitrust remedial decrees).
89. Cf. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 899 (1977) ("In keeping with modern
criminal justice philosophy, probation is stated as a form of sentence rather than, as in
current law, a suspension of the imposition or execution of sentence.")
90. The current federal probation statute does not mention corporate defendants ex-
plicitly; it provides generally that a judge may impose probation "when satisfied that the
ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served
thereby." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). Proposed revisions of the Federal Criminal Code provide
367
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 353, 1979
and state9' statutes, and has in fact been ordered in five reported
cases.
92
1. What Is Corporate Probation?
As it does for individuals, a term of probation for a corporation
principally requires that an offender comply for a specified period of
time93 with certain conditions established by the sentencing court.
Conditions of probation must be reasonably related to the rehabilita-
tion of the offender and the protection of society; 94 thus, internal
corporate modifications ordered must address factors that caused an
offense or that are likely to cause future offenses. The cost of complying
explicitly that organizations may be placed on probation, see S. 1437, supra note 3, at
§ 2001(c)(1); H.R. 6869, supra note 3, at § 2001(c)(1), and provide criteria to be con-
sidered by a court in determining whether to order probation, see S. 1437, supra note 3,
at § 2102; H.R. 6869, supra note 3, at § 2102. Statutory authorization for such sentences
is critical since courts have no nonstatutory authority to impose a sentence of probation.
United States v. Pregerson, 448 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1971).
91. Two state courts have reached opposite conclusions in construing state statutes on
this question. Compare State ex rel. Howell County v. West Plains Tel. Co., 232 Mo. 579,
135 S.W. 20 (1911) (apparent forerunner of contemporary probation statutes held inap-
plicable to corporate defendants) with Borough of Roselle v. Santone Constr. Co., 119
N.J. Super. 314, 291 A.2d 385 (1972) (state probation statute held applicable to corpora-
tion).
In general, as most state probation statutes are similar in breadth of purpose to the
federal statute, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204 (1974) (court may place offender
on probation upon conviction for any offense other than designated class of felonies);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney 1975) (criteria for ordering sentence of probation
include, inter alia, that such disposition not be inconsistent with ends of justice), the
reasoning of the federal courts, see note 92 infra, appears applicable.
92. See Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
827 (1976); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389
(10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. J.C. Ehrlich
Co., 372 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1974); cf. note 108 infra (discussing case in which sentence
of corporate probation was imposed and later rescinded).
Considerations of legislative history, statutory interpretation, and social policy support
the validity of these sentences. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58
(7th Cir. 1972); Comment, Criminal Law-The Application of the Federal Probation Act
to the Corporate Entity, 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 294 (1974) (Atlantic Richfield right as to
validity of corporate probation, but wrong as to limitations it found necessary to such
sentences); cf. Note, supra note 2, at 1108 n.67 (policy considerations support use of such
sentences). But see ABA Criminal Code Revision Committee, supra note 43, at 16 (even
though S. 1437 and H.R. 6869 provide that organizations may be placed on probation,
conditions of probation indicate that probation is designed for human beings).
93. A term of probation ordered by a federal court may not exceed five years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1976).
94. See United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
959 (1978); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); ABA, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970). While a sentencing court has broad discre-
tion as to probation conditions, such conditions are subject to appellate review. See United
States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 679-83 (2d Cir. 1976); People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541
P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975).
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with such conditions may equal any amount up to the maximum fine
authorized for the crime for which the corporation was convicted. 95
Thus, a court can supersede the corporation's judgment as to the extent
of measures necessary to ensure future compliance, but only up to a
statutory maximum.96
2. When Is Corporate Probation Appropriate?
Two criteria identify those corporate crimes for which judicially
supervised restructuring, and thus sentences of corporate probation,
are well-suited.97
First, such sentences are most necessary in cases involving very dan-
gerous or inherently wrongful crimes. Violations defined as criminal
offenses generally involve such qualities,98 and prosecutorial policies
stress the same criteria. 99 But since it is nonetheless possible that a
95. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) ("It is
evident ... that the conditions imposed by a court in connection with the suspension of
sentence may not, at least if objected to by the defendant, exceed the maximum penalty
authorized by Congress."). But cf. C. STONE, supra note 8, at 188 n. t (legality of probation
costs in excess of maximum statutory fine uncertain under current law).
This principle justifies the prevailing rule that probation is a form of sentence and thus
cannot be refused by an offender. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th
Cir. 1937) (Federal Probation Act "vests a discretion in the Court, not a choice in the
convict"); Comment, supra note 92, at 301-03 (citing cases supporting rule). But see In re
Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371, 377, 334 P.2d 1, 5 (1958) (under California law, defendant has
right to refuse probation). In the one case in which this issue arose with respect to a
corporate defendant, the court found it unnecessary to decide it. See United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
96. For this purpose, cost should be computed as the amount by which the total ex-
pense of implementing required conditions exceeds the minimum cost which the corpora-
tion would need to spend to ensure law-abiding behavior in the absence of a court order.
Thus, the company would first be required to indicate the least expensive steps that it
would have undertaken voluntarily. The court would review the reasonableness of this
estimate, and would deduct that amount from the maximum cost of probation conditions
it could impose if it were within the broad range typically afforded corporate officials on
questions of business judgment. This method of calculation would avoid both the Scylla
of a court having the power to order excessive punishments and the Charybdis of a
company having the power to escape any burden by estimating its voluntary costs at
zero.
97. A court might decide that such a sentence is appropriate on the basis of either
evidence presented at trial or a presentence report. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (providing
that no limitation be placed on information concerning convict's background, character,
and conduct that court may consider in sentencing).
98. See Hart, supra note 37, at 404-05 ("crime" is act incurring moral condemnation).
99. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAwS,
REPORT 349 (1955) (criminal prosecutions appropriate only when offenses are clear and
flagrant); Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement, 31 FOOD, DRUG & Cosms. L.J. 324, 328
(1976) ("seriousness of violation" is first criterion for FDA decision to prosecute); cf.
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 426 (1963) (conception of criminal sanction as last
resort, to be used only when other sanctions fail, implicit in legislative scheme of
economic regulation). But see Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7
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corporation could be convicted of a relatively trivial offense, a sen-
tencing court must ultimately determine in its discretion whether an
offense is sufficiently serious to warrant imposing a sanction of corpo-
rate probation. 00
Second, such sentences are potentially most effective in cases of
"structural crime," that is, cases in which a corporate offense has
resulted in large part from the effects of institutional forces rather than
from the culpable acts of identifiable individuals. Structural reforms
might be necessary even when one or more individual corporate of-
ficials can be convicted, 1°1 however, since institutional forces may con-
tinue to encourage violations even after culpable officials are re-
moved. 102 One indication that such factors are important would be a
recurrence of similar offenses by the same company involving different
personnel.1
0 3
Finally, a sentence of corporate probation may be appropriate, in-
dependently of the need for internal corporate restructuring, in cases
in which the payment of restitution to victims is desirable as part of
the resolution of a criminal proceeding. Restitution has been in-
creasingly advocated as an appropriate objective of criminal prosecu-
tions'04 and may be especially important in the case of convicted cor-
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 16 (1940) (criminal prosecutions only effective deterrents to
antitrust violations; civil suits useful only as supplements). Prosecution of the Ford Motor
Co. for reckless homicide, for example, resulted from a decision that the alleged reckless
design and manufacture of the Pinto involved "such a substantial deviation from the
conduct required of an automobile manufacturer as to warrant a [criminal] prosecu-
tion .... Note, supra note 5, at 911.
100. Cf. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 250-51 (sanction of sub-
jecting company "to a SEC-supervised reorganization of existing management" reserved
for companies with "more than three nontechnical violations of the [proposed] Federal
Chartering Act within a three-year period.")
101. The light sentences that convicted corporate officials traditionally have received
may undermine the value of their convictions. See, e.g., Baker & Reeves, The Paper
Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 623 n.16 (1977) (officials convicted of criminal
antitrust offenses typically receive light sentences-small fines with little or no prison time
imposed-although experience demonstrates that prison sentences are most effective de-
terrent); Liman, id. at 630, 630-31 (same). But see Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences:
An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 593-99 (1977) (arguing that sentences requiring individual
defendants to speak publicly about their experiences could maximize deterrence).
102. See p. 364 supra.
103. See note 67 suPra.
104. Recent proposals for a revised Federal Criminal Code have suggested that a fine
not be ordered, or its amount be limited, if it would hinder or prevent a defendant from
paying restitution. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 994, § 3302; MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 7-02(3)(b) (P.O.D. 1962). Commentators have argued that victims have both a more im-
mediate need for and a more compelling equitable claim to restitution than the govern-
ment has regarding a fine. See M. FRY, ARMs OF THE LAW 124-26 (1951); Wolfgang, Victim
Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REv. 223, 226-27 (1965).
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porations.1 05 However, courts currently order payment of restitution
in criminal cases only rarely,' °6 in large part because such orders are
generally not legislatively authorized as part of a criminal sentence
except as a condition of probation. 10 7 When damages attributable to a
corporate crime can be assessed,' 0 s the benefits attainable from an order
of restitution' 09 may provide a significant additional reason for im-
posing a sentence of corporate probation.
105. Two of the principal factors limiting the use of restitution orders with in-
dividuals are generally inapplicable to corporations. First, unlike many individual proba-
tioners, large corporations would be able to pay significant amounts of restitution. In-
deed, restitution serves an important goal of corporate sentences by forcing defendants to
disgorge their illegally obtained gain. See p. 362 supra. Second, courts have been re-
luctant to order restitution in cases involving violent crimes, in part because of perceived
difficulties in valuing resulting injuries. See Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An His-
torical Overview, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 45, 56 (J. Hudson & B. Calaway eds.
1977); Wolfgang, supra note 104, at 229. Since most corporate crimes involve property,
financial, or other easily measurable damages, see Kadish, supra note 99, at 423-27, they
present no such problem.
106. See Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. REv. 203, 215-17
(1978); Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized, 50
MINN. L. REv. 243, 243-44 (1965). But cf. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CREsSEY, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 318 (8th ed. 1970) (because of informal or negotiated agreements, restitution
may be more common than official statistics indicate).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976); MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(2)(b) (P.O.D. 1962); S.
1437, supra note 3, at § 2103(b)(3); cf. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION §§ 3.2(c)
vii, (c)viii (1970) (advocating use of restitution as condition of probation); P. O'DONNELL,
M. CHURGIN, & D. CURTIS, supra note 37, at 101 (same). But see S. 1437, supra note
3, at § 2006 (proposing sentence allowing court to order restitution, for any kind of
damage caused, in conjunction with any other permissible sentence). At least one state
has made restitution a mandatory condition of probation. See IowA CODE ANN. § 907.12(3)
(West 1978). For cases ordering defendants to pay restitution as a condition of probation,
see United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977)
(individual defendant); United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540
F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1976) (corporate and unincorporated defendants).
108. Restitution payments ordered in criminal cases must be limited to damages at-
tributable to the crime. United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 841 (1978); United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir,), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894
(1962) (amount must be so limited, but may be determined subsequent to order). In one
case that appears to have exceeded this limit, United States v. Olin Corp., N-77-30 (D.
Conn., filed June 1, 1978), the court initially placed Olin on probation and ordered it to
pay $510,000 (equal to the maximum possible fine) to charitable organizations in the
New Haven community as "reparations" for the harm done the community by the com-
pany's illegal arms sales to South Africa; this was apparently the only condition of
probation. See N.Y. Times, March 31, 1978, at Dl. However, after Olin announced that it
would "voluntarily" establish a $500,000 New Haven Community Betterment Fund, the
court rescinded the term of probation and fined the company $45,000. See N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1978, at DI; cf. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1978, at 28 (editorial criticizing initial
sentence).
109. An order of restitution can serve either to supplement a separate civil damage
suit or to render one unnecessary. See State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688 n.8, 552 P.2d
829, 832 n.8 (1976) (acceptance of restitution payments does not terminate victim's right
to pursue civil remedies, but defendants may set off such payments against any civil
award); Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 181, 183
(1967) (same). Thus, such an order might be especially appropriate where victims have
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3. What Probation Conditions Should Be Imposed?
Once a court determines that a term of probation is the proper sen-
tence for a convicted corporation, it should impose conditions of proba-
tion that focus on the modification of those features of corporate or-
ganization that facilitated commission of the offense.110
To address the principal institutional causes of corporate offenses,
probation conditions should require a corporation to institute pro-
cedures designed to evaluate and report data potentially relevant to
the discovery or prevention of future violations, or to delineate ex-
plicitly the responsibilities of particular officials in response to such
information."'- Requiring specific information-processing measures
would help ensure that offenses caused by officials' failure sufficiently
to pursue facts suggestive of an incipient violation do not recur." 2
Similarly, clarifying the bases of officers' personal liability would pre-
clude reliance on standard corporate operating procedures as a defense
in the future, thus assuring that the gap in supervision that engendered
the prior offense would not recur. 1 3 Such measures are especially im-
portant in situations in which a single set of institutional processes may
generate a variety of offenses.1 4
These probation conditions require little judicial involvement in
complex substantive management decisions, providing an important
individual claims too small to sustain separate litigation expenses. See, e.g., Eisen V.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (costs of providing plaintiff class members with
required notices must be prepaid by class representative even when such costs might
exceed recovery); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUMi. L. REv. 55, 56 n.5, 67-70
(1933) (public welfare offenses involve large number of victims but each has slight in-
dividual damages).
110. See pp. 367-68 supra (discussing justifications for probation conditions).
111. Probation conditions should be as specific as possible, both to ensure maximum
effectiveness, see Note, supra note 76, at 457-61, and to guarantee necessary fairness and
notice to the defendant, see ABA STANDARDS RELATIrG TO PROBATION § 3.2(B) (1970).
112. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 199-209 ("mending" corporate information net
critical to prevention of offenses); cf. Note, supra note 78, at 1086 (effectiveness of master
in prison reform litigation limited "because he has neither the tools nor the mandate to
restructure the patterns of decisionmaking and behavior that perpetuate" conditions
leading to intervention).
113. See Fisse, suPra note 46, at 272 (requiring company to specify internal lines of
responsibility facilitates future prosecutions of culpable officers); cf. C. STONE, supra note
8, at 203 (discussing employment discrimination consent decree that "pins down on
particular officers exactly what their responsibility is to be in the maintenance and
monitoring of the system").
114. Certain corporate activities involve a single procedure that generates repeated
potential for the occurrence of similar offenses. A company that produces drugs, for
example, might employ the same system of testing and evaluating each of hundreds of
new drugs. Because a single gap in such a system could generate potential offenses in the
production of each drug, internal reform measures would be especially important.
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ease of monitoring. 115 In some cases, a court might require only that
a corporation undertake one discrete action-for example, appointing
an independent committee to audit specified records-which would
then itself serve to maintain compliance on an on-going basis. 11 6 In
more complex cases, a court might appoint a consultant experienced in
a relevant field to investigate the situation, recommend appropriate
probation conditions, and then monitor their implementation." 7
Whatever the nature of the modifications ordered, their extensive-
ness should be calibrated to the level and complexity of the institu-
tional malfunction involved."18 For example, if an offense stemmed
from a failure of lower-level managers adequately to supervise non-
managerial activities (such as clerical or scientific work), probation
conditions might require the company to institute explicit reporting
systems and supervisory responsibilities at that level. Similarly, if an
offense stemmed from a failure on the part of upper-level managers
adequately to investigate or review facts indicating a possible in-
cipient offense, a court might appoint a corporate-level audit com-
mittee with responsibilities for monitoring their decisions. In some
cases, a court might find that a certain area of corporate operations
was so pervasively susceptible to criminal violations that prevention of
future offenses required termination of those operations."19
115. See Note, supra note 76, at 440-45 (monitoring institution's conduct essential to
effective judicial oversight).
116. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
94,754 (D.D.C. 1974) (ordering, inter alia, that company establish committee to review
accounting procedures and controls and financial reports).
117. For example, a health scientist, antitrust lawyer, or specialist in information
sstems or organizational behavior might be an appropriate corporate probation officer
in a particular case. See C. STONE, supra note 8, at 185 (suggesting such use of sanitation
engineer for pollution violations). See generally Note, supra note 78, at 1068-72 (use of
special masters crucial to success of institutional reform litigation involving prisons).
118. Cf. Jeffries and Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1376 (1979) ("proportionality" of penal sanctions to
crimes a fundamental constraint on criminal sentences).
119. See United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc. 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974) (as condition
of probation, corporation convicted of interstate transportation of obscene materials pro-
hibited from engaging in distribution of related materials in future); S. 1437, suPra note
3, at § 2103(b)(6) (specifically authorizing order that defendant refrain from certain oc-
cupation or business as condition of probation). Courts have held most such conditions
permissible but others impermissible as applied to individuals. Compare Whaley v.
United States, 324 F.2d 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964) (uphold-
ing probation condition barring probationer from engaging in repossession business, in
course of which he had committed criminal fraud) with United States v. Polk, 556 F.2d
803 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977) (holding probation condition requiring
lawyer to surrender license to practice law abuse of sentencing court's discretion). See
generally United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 682 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing limits on
appropriate probation conditions).
Probation conditions of this kind can be both more effective and less disruptive than a
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As this emphasis on articulating explicit intracorporate lines of
responsibility suggests, the ultimate mechanism for ensuring corporate
compliance with probation conditions is the potential personal liability
of individual officials for unexcused failures to carry out their assigned
duties.120 Imposition of such liability, however, should be necessary
in only a minority of cases. When noncompliance results from factors
beyond the control of any individual, perhaps reflecting the effects of
still unreconstructed corporate processes, a court should first attempt
to bring the corporation into compliance by adjusting the conditions
ordered or by increasing their specificity.
121
Conclusion
Achieving the goals of the criminal law with respect to corporate
offenders requires a new type of corporate sentence, one responsive to
institutional processes that facilitate corporate offenses. By providing
a framework within which a court can in appropriate cases require
sentence dissolving or revoking the charter of a corporation. While dissolution is some-
times suggested as an effective sanction, see 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 3, at 193;
Davids, supra note 11, at 530, it is less feasible for several reasons. First, a court of one
jurisdiction will lack authority to revoke the charter of a corporation chartered under
the laws of another. Second, as to small or closely held companies, dissolution alone does
not prevent the controlling parties from simply regrouping in new form. See Fisse, supra
note 46, at 252 (deterrent impact of dissolution wholly subject to vagaries of reorganiza-
tion). Finally, as to large corporations, the socially disruptive effects of dissolution of a
whole company would generally be so great as to outweigh its benefits. See C. STONE,
supra note 8, at 36.
120. See Fisse, supra note 46, at 272-73 (preventive orders provide means for imposing
individual liability if offenses recur); Note, supra note 78, at 1079 (noting importance of
threat of individual liability in judicially supervised prison reform); Note, supra note 76,
at 448-50 (contempt citations against individual officials are most conventional enforce-
ment measure in cases attempting reform of public institutions). But see id. at 452
(courts may decline to issue contempt order when lack of institutional compliance was
for reasons beyond any individual's control).
The general rule that a person who is not a party to a judicial proceeding may never-
theless be bound by it if he has either abetted a party or is legally identified with a
party and has notice of the proceeding, see, e.g., NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 568 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1977); Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 438 F.2d 176, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971), has been
specifically applied to hold corporate officials liable for the failure of their company to
abide by court orders. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911) (failure to
respond to subpoena duces tecum); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525,
571 (N.D. 111. 1973), supplemented, 370 F. Supp. 881, aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974)
(failure to comply with terms of injunction).
121. See Fisse, supra note 46, at 272-73 (orders of internal restructuring lend them-
selves readily to progressive pressures and modifications over time); Note, supra note 76
(modifying order to address institutional processes more precisely is both more effective
and less antagonizing than imposing contempt sanctions).
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limited, administratively manageable internal reforms, a sentence of
corporate probation can uniquely achieve these objectives. Such a
sentence is permissible under present statutes and represents an ap-
propriate and desirable use of judicial discretion as to sentencing. 122
122. Although the scheme proposed in this Note can be implemented by judges under
current law, it also has implications for legislators drafting criminal codes. The appro-
priateness of probation as a sentence for corporate defendants should be clarified, see
note 90 supra, permissible or desirable conditions of corporate probation should be
articulated, see Stone, Proposed Model Code for Corporate Rehabilitation, reprinted in
Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 297-301 (1976) (appendix to statement of Christopher D. Stone),
and mechanisms for implementing such sentences, whether through existing probation
boards or otherwise, should be established. The availability of a sentence of corporate
probation might also influence a prosecutor deciding whether to prosecute a corpora-
tion, negotiating with corporate officials, or making recommendations as to sentencing.
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